Week 9 Notes

Distribute:
Handout.
Article "Naturalisms" (Amanda Bryant) from the Royal Institute of Philosophy journal *Think* (Autumn 2020).

Begin with sociology:
Recall Misak's two big contributions:
- redescribing and recentering classical American pragmatism by emphasizing the Peirce-Lewis-Sellars wing, and
- discerning the tradition of Cambridge pragmatism of Ramsey and LW.

That tradition is alive and well in the first two occupants of the new Bertrand Russell Professorship of Philosophy, at Trinity College, Cambridge:
Simon Blackburn and his Nachfolger, Huw Price.
(Misak herself belongs to this current generation of Cambridge pragmatists, having done her doctorate there.)

I.   Recap:

a). **Object naturalism vs. subject naturalism**:
        i. "Object": naturalism about the objects one is talking about, describing or representing, vs.
        ii. "Subject": naturalism about the practices one engages in in using the expressions the object naturalist understands on a representational semantic model.

b). **Priority Thesis**:
One must in any case tell a story of kind (ii). One will (in addition?) tell a story of kind (i) just in case one applies a representational semantic model to the vocabulary-in-use being addressed. This is Price's "priority thesis."

c). Can understand the "naturalism" the two methodologies share in terms of the (meta)vocabulary one uses to specify, respectively, the objects referred to and facts stated by (Armstrong's "truthmakers") use of the target vocabulary in question. One is to use a "naturalistic" vocabulary. This might be the vocabulary of fundamental physics, of the special natural sciences, or just some theoretically supplemented ordinary empirical descriptive

vocabulary. **This is a matter of the choice of "base" vocabulary, to use as a metavocabulary in understanding the target vocabulary.**

d). BB: But that base vocabulary need not be "naturalistic." One might choose as one's preferred (privileged) vocabulary, any vocabulary one takes *not* to be puzzling or problematic, some *other* vocabulary. (Suggestions below)

<u>Prospectus and Overview</u>:

This is taking Price's object naturalism / subject naturalism distinction and "**dividing through by the naturalism**."
In a sense, I will also "**divide through by the representationalism**."
By that I mean, I'll be concerned with semantic metavocabularies generally—not just naturalistic ones.
So I'll be concerned with how *semantic* metavocabularies related to *pragmatic* metavocabularies, generally.
And, rather than assume that there is some *one* vocabulary, in Huw's case, *naturalistic* vocabulary, that is the preferred candidate in *both* cases, I present (in *BSD*) a *meta*metavocabulary for discussing the relations between semantic and pragmatic metavocabularies.
This is what is articulated by the "meaning-use diagrams" I introduce and develop there. Doing that is articulating an "analytic pragmatism," in the sense of "pragmatism" that consists in treating pragmatic metavocabularies as conceptually prior (prior in the preferred order of explanation) to semantic metavocabularies.
This is the story of **Part I** of today's session.

[This bit is pushed back to opening of Week 10]:
At the other end of the session, **Part V**, I look at *another* way in which *BSD* fills in fine structure of a Price-like account. Here I discuss my (neo)*Kantian expressivism*, and raise the sort of question Huw raises about the relation of *Humean* expressivism (HEX) to the exercises of offering explanations in a *normative* pragmatic metavocabulary (understood in accord with Rorty's social pragmatism about norms), in *MIE*. The final question is: what is the relation between the *Kantian* expressivism of *BSD* and my subsequent understanding of Sellars's version of Kant's categories in terms of pragmatic metavocabularies (inspired by Carnap, retailed in my *From Empiricism to Expressivism*), on the one hand, to the Humean expressivism that Huw synthesizes with Rortyan pragmatism, on the one hand, and my stories, on the other.

Telling this story is recollecting—rationally reconstructing in an expressively progressive way—where Huw and I were in our interacting understandings *circa* 2006—2013.

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e). For what we are talking about is two different sorts of **metavocabulary**.

i. *Object* naturalism is commitment to using a naturalistic vocabulary as a certain sort of ***semantic* metavocabulary**. In accord with a methodological commitment to an exclusively ***representational*** semantics, the object naturalist is committed to using a **naturalistic** vocabulary to specify the objects represented and the facts stated by using the potentially problematic target vocabulary (one of the "3 'M's", or semantic or intentional vocabulary, vocabulary introduce by abstraction, or whatever one might find puzzling).

ii. *Subject* naturalism is commitment to using a naturalistic vocabulary as a ***pragmatic* metavocabulary**. That is a vocabulary to use to specify what one must *do* in order thereby to count as using the target vocabulary so as to confer on its expressions the meanings they actually have: the semantic values a semantic theory associates with them. These meanings and semantic values might be understood representationally, or they might not. One might offer a broadly *functionalist* account of how use, specified in the preferred pragmatic metavocabulary, confers content, however one understands content according to one's semantic theory.

One possibility for a non-representational order of semantic explanation understands it as inferential role of sentences, with the contents of subsentential expressions understood in terms of *substitution* inferences and *anaphoric* connections, as in the ISA—inference/substitution/anaphora—account of *MIE*).

f). The **pragmatic metavocabulary** one uses for this purpose need not be *naturalistic*, though. One might looks to use a ***normative* metavocabulary**, which specifies (not necessarily "describes") how it is proper or correct to use expressions.

This would be a ***one*-sorted normative vocabulary**, using evaluations of correct/incorrect, justified/unjustified, or proper/improper. That is what *assertibility theories,* as in Dewey, Sellars, or Dummett do.

Or one might use the ***two*-sorted normative vocabulary** of commitment and entitlement (to commitments), or of responsibility and authority. I argue in *MIE* that such a two-sorted normative pragmatic metavocabulary is *much* more expressively powerful than the one-sorted variety. And in *A Spirit of Trust* I read Hegel as deploying such a two-sorted normative pragmatic metavocabulary, using the terms "independence" and "dependence" for authority and responsibility. In all these cases, one can follow what I take to be the Rortyan social pragmatist approach to normativity, which understands *normative* statuses (such as commitment and entitlement, responsibility and authority) as *social* statuses. One is then using a pragmatic metavocabulary to specify the implicitly normative social practices that confer semantic content on expressions and performances that play suitable functional roles in those practices.

g). So I want to

i. Emphasize the importance of the methodological distinction Price is making under the rubric of the distinction between object naturalism and subject naturalism.
ii. Understand it in terms of two ways of using a naturalistic vocabulary as a *meta*vocabulary.
iii. Understand those two ways as *representational semantic* metavocabulary and *pragmatic* metavocabulary respectively. That is, a metavocabulary for understanding what one is saying or meaning, and what one must be *doing* in order to say or mean that.
iv. "Divide through by the naturalism in 'object naturalism' and 'subject naturalism', by *not* necessarily requiring that the preferred metavocabularies be *naturalistic,* in *either* case.

h). In this way, I want to point out the important similarities and commonalities between Price's distinction (first introduced in 2006 or 2007, rerwritten as the first of his Descartes lectures, published in 2013), and my Locke lectures (delivered in 2006, published as *Between Saying and Doing* in 2008). (These dates are informational only. The point is not that there is any sort of priority issue. It is rather that we were thinking along the same lines about what was needed to move our consilient projects along.).

In the first of those lectures, I distinguish (as I have since argued that the early Sellars does):

between **semantic and pragmatic metavocabularies**, and

between unproblematic **(preferred, privileged)** *base* **vocabularies** and **problematic (puzzling, suspect)** *target* **vocabularies**,

in understanding what I take to be the two classical core projects of TwenCen analytic philosophy: **naturalism and empiricism**.

The point of *BSD* project is to explore relations between *pragmatic* and *semantic* metavocabularies generally, by introducing a distinctive kind of formally regimented *meta***metavocabulary** that lets us talk about both: what I call "meaning-use analysis."

(Early on in that project I explained what I was doing to Huw, as we had lunch in a Thai restaurant in Sydney, and sketched a meaning-use diagram on a napkin. He saved it, and later used a picture of it as a slide in a presentation at a conference we both attended.)

i). All of these ideas should be understood (and are, by Huw every bit as much as by me) as **applications of Rorty's 'vocabulary' vocabulary**, and as ways of filling in and developing his pragmatist anti-representationalism.

II.   "One Cheer for Representationalism":

Where we are going this week:

Price's synthesizing classical Rortyan pragmatist arguments against representationalism with Humean expressivist antirepresentationalist arguments, as he redescribes and extends them. This happens mostly in the middle essay: "Expressivism for two voices".

Key points here are:

a) **Two specifications of the significance of "semantic minimalism" for Huw's "subject naturalist" project.**

> i . I have suggested that the immediate target HP wants to argue against (reject, by objecting to, diagnosing the mistakes in, offer reasons against by objecting to the reasons given for it) can be thought of as in two parts: *declarativism* and *descriptivism*. **"Semantic minimalism" serves to break the link between declarativism and descriptivism that goes through pointing out that whatever content is expressed by declarative sentences is truth-evaluable.**
>
> Declarativism uses the fact that a great many uses of expressions have in common their expressibility by the use of declarative sentences.
> This should be understood in terms of the **"iron triangle of discursiveness**":

- On the side of *pragmatics*, which is Fregean force or the theory of the use of expressions—the practices (social) or abilities-dispositions (individual)—of applying expressions, they can be used assertionally,
- On the side of *syntax*, the linguistic expressions are declarative sentences,
- On the side of *semantics*, the theory of *content* or *meaning*, they express propositions.
The connections among these are important.

> I take the pragmatics to be conceptually fundamental, by which I mean prior in the order of explanation. (Note: there need not be "the" unique order of explanation. Here we can distinguish the two orders of explanation corresponding to Dummettian theories of meaning and meaning theories, if we think of the former as explaining meaning in terms of use and the latter as explaining proprieties of use in terms of meanings. [Cf. Mass action vs. action by the masses: Leninists can be all in favor of the first, when properly led by the vanguard party, but they would never substitute the latter for the former.]
>
> To say that *semantically*, declarative sentences express propositions (or, better, are specifically *propositionally* contentful, which is a way of being *conceptually* contentful) is to gesture towards their having not only "free-standing" uses, which we understand as paradigmatically *assertional*, but also *embedded* uses.
>
> This is the "Frege-Geach point." One must see *something* as common to the assertional use of "It is raining" and the use of that sentence when embedded as the antecedent of a conditional, in "*If* it is raining, *then* the streets will be wet," in order to

infer from their conjunction by detaching the consequent of the conditional: *So* the streets will be wet. What they have in common we can call their "content," and that it *can* be used assertionally (that its "free-standing" use has the *pragmatic* significance of *assertion*) is what we mean (to begin with, *all* we mean) by calling it "*propositional* content." The idea is that in asserting the conditional *If* it is raining, *then* the streets will be wet," we have *not* asserted the antecedent "It is raining." The function of the embedded (unasserted) occurrence of that sentence is just to contribute to the content of the compound sentence formed from it, the conditional, which *is* asserted.

Metaethical expressivism about normative vocabulary (their paradigm is *moral* normative vocabulary, but I think it is misleading to take that as the paradigm. The paradigm should be the broader category of *discursive* normativity, the normativity involved in applying concepts quite generally, that Kant first appreciated and thematized.). The term "expressivism" refers to an order of explanation that starts with an account of the significance of ethical *assertings*, in expressivist terms of what one is *doing* in performing these speech acts. The idea is that one is expressing an attitude, paradigmatically, approval/disapproval—cf. "Boo"/"Hurrah"—but it has versions, such as mine, where one looks to what *commitments* one is undertaking by making assertional use of normative vocabulary).

The distinction between the *first-wave* metaethical expressivism of A.J. Ayer and C.L. Stevenson and the *second-wave* metaethical expressivism of Simon Blackburn and Alan Gibbard is just recognizing as an essential criterion of adequacy of giving a "force-first" explanation that one be able to account not only for "*free-standing*" uses of normative expressions, but also *embedded* ones, where one is not expressing or endorsing an attitude. The paradigm, again, is when the normative expression occurs in the antecedent of a conditional. In asserting "If what X did is wrong, I will not respect him for doing it," I have not expressed an attitude or undertaken a commitment regarding what X did." *Locus classicus* for this argument is Geach's short, gemlike essay "Ascriptivism."

The *pragmatist* order of semantic explanation—in a sense of 'pragmatist' that is *not* Rorty's (it is mine, what I call "semantic pragmatism"), but which is not simply disjoint from his—goes from the pragmatic significance to the semantic content. The idea is that the concept of <u>declarative sentence</u> is to be understood as what can be used *both* free-standing, to make assertions, *and* embedded, to contribute systematically to the content *and* assertional significance of *assertible* compound sentences in which it is embedded.

What Huw gives "one cheer" to is my unified account of the speech act of assertion, and its elaboration basically just as here, explaining what is *right* about declarativism, the correct observation that is its starting-point, by explaining the iron triangle of discursiveness (pragmatic, semantic, syntactic) according to the semantic

pragmatist order of explanation. But I'll return to this point later, when doing the compare-and-contrast of our positions at the end of my discussion of OCR.

This is an account of '**declarativism***' part of what leads to global representationalism. It invites a *uniform semantic* account of <u>propositional content</u>, understood as the sort of content that all declarative sentences have, both in their free-standing and their embedded uses.

Descriptivism is then commitment to giving this uniform semantic account in terms of the concepts of <u>description</u> or (more broadly and correctly) <u>representation</u>. On the side of pragmatics, this is the idea that what one is doing in asserting is describing, in the sense of saying how things are.

Clearly, one can reject global representationalism either by

- accepting the one-size-fits-all declarativist commitment and rejecting the descriptivist or representationalist characterization of the core semantic content (say, because one thinks it is better to use <u>inference</u> to play that role), or

- because one is a semantic pluralist, typically, because one is a pragmatic pluralist. That is, one thinks that one does *lots* of things with declarative sentences besides describing how things are: christening ships, getting married, expressing disgust....

The representationalist remarks by Frank Jackson and Simon Blackburn that Huw cites in the opening 'graph of "One Cheer..." are meant to remind us that it is obvious that at least *one* important thing we do with assertions is describe or represent how things are. Huw wants to reject that, except in a theoretically anodyne sense that goes with assertional declarativism.

"Semantic minimalism" serves to break the link between declarativism and descriptivism that goes through pointing out that whatever content is expressed by declarative sentences is truth-evaluable. Any assertible sentence *p* allows the question: "But is it true that *p*?" Then we can ask "Under what circumstances or conditions would it be true that *p?"* And then the way seems not only open, but obligatory to understanding the truth-makers of declarative sentences as ways the world is being described by them as being, the facts they are stating, how we are describing things as being when we use them. **Deflationary redundancy, disquotational, or prosentential theories of the use of 'true' break this connection between declarativism and descriptivism, this route from one to the other.**

ii. Huw is concerned with another way of thinking about "semantic minimalism." This is that it involves a ***negative*, *deflationary* thesis**, and a ***positive*, *bifurcationist* thesis**. The negative thesis is that there is no property of truth (relation of reference) that bits of vocabulary are being described as having when we use 'true' or 'refers.' To think there is is to make a grammatical category mistake. **The positive thesis is that this should be**

understood by contrast to the function of ordinary empirical descriptive (OED) vocabulary like 'red', and 'square', 'mass' and 'Leibniz'. Boghossian (among others) has argued that making this second move, invidiously distinguishing semantic vocabulary as *not* describing or referring in the way OED vocabulary does, involves acknowledging that descriptivism or representationalism is true for the contrasting OED vocabulary. So we still need a standard semantic account of that kind of description-representation.

   Price's response is to drop the positive, bifurcationist point. He recommends that "semantic minimalists" make *only* the deflationist point. That is enough, in my terms, to block the route that leads from declarativism's semantic uniformitarianism to global descriptivism via the invocation of the truth-evaluability of all declarative sentences, hence to the applicability of a semantic model of truth conditions, and the object-naturalist location or placement problem of finding truth-*makers* specifiable in a naturalistic vocabulary.

b). It is against the background of this distinction between a good deflationist approach to traditional semantic vocabulary of 'truth' and 'reference' and a bad (bridge too far) invidious metaphysical bifurcationist distinction between the function of such vocabulary and the function of OED vocabulary **that Price sees me as endorsing two different sorts of project, one of which he wholly approves and applauds and the other of which he sees as bifurcationist and therefore dangerous. His "one cheer" is for the former. And it is his rejection of the latter, more systematic and constructive enterprise, is what positions him, as he properly observes, ideologically closer to Rorty than I am**.
The two are:

  i. I have gone far beyond standard semantic deflationism by offering accounts of what we are *doing* in using a wide variety of expressions that are normally thought of as requiring descriptivist-representationalist semantic treatments.

   These are offered in my preferred *pragmatic metavocabularies*. Those pragmatic metavocabularies are richly normative, with the notions of normative statuses of <u>commitment</u> and <u>entitlement</u> (which articulate the two-dimensional normative structure I see as essential to practices of giving and challenging reasons, by contrast to one-dimensional normative structures of correct/incorrect, proper/improper, assertable/unassertable) being given a social pragmatist account as essentially *social* statuses, instituted by the role performances and practitioners play in discursive practices.

   But Huw can see these accounts as broadly in line with, and indeed, as ways of working out in detail his recommendation that we practice *subject naturalism*, *modulo* the difference in our preferred pragmatic metavocabularies (his naturalistic and mine social-normative).

   So I have offered accounts (in my preferred pragmatic metavocabulary) of what one is *doing* in using not only traditional semantic vocabulary such as 'true' and 'refers', but also (as we have seen) ascriptions of propositional attitude. That includes an account

in terms of the fundamental social-perspectival distinction of normative attitudes between *attributing* a normative status (commitment or entitlement) to *another* and *undertaking* or *acknowledging* it *oneself*, of the expressive role of *de re* ascriptions as opposed to *de dicto* ones, which I claim to be the origin in ordinary language of the distinction between what we are *saying* (*de dicto*) and what we are talking *about* (*de re*).

I have appealed to the notion of <u>substitution inferences</u> and the commitments they involve in relation to assertional commitments to explain the difference in use and expressive role between singular terms and predicates, and the distinctive significance of sortals.

And I have given accounts in terms of the same sort of anaphoric word-word connections appealed to in explaining the expressive roles of 'true' and 'refers' of the use of proper names demonstratives, and quantificational expressions.

In these same general pragmatic inferentialist terms I have articulated the expressive role characteristic of *logical* vocabulary, paradigmatically conditionals and negation.

All of these stories are exactly the sort Huw thinks a subject naturalist should be telling.

Again, we need to bracket the difference between our preferred pragmatic metavocabularies. But **at the end of "One Cheer..." he suggests that I am wrong to think that my use of normative vocabulary means I am not his sort of subject naturalist.** For I also offer an account of the *use* in virtue of which *normative* vocabulary plays the special and distinctive expressive role that it does. This, he suggests, is sufficient to show that the difference between us is not *ontological*, in the sense that I think there are things in the world, normative statuses, that he does not. **For my use of normative terms in my pragmatic metavocabulary, too, is explained ultimately in terms of what one must *do* in order to be conferring that distinctive kind of content on one's locutions, not in terms of how one is representing the world as being.**

ii.   So far, he thinks, so good. But Price points out that I also talk about what I'm doing in terms that are *not* so congenial to (or so easily co-optable by) his sort of subject naturalist. For **I also claim to be *reconstructing*, in terms acceptable to a social pragmatist about normativity, "the representational dimension of conceptual content**," rather than (as I claim in the title of the paper on reference) *explaining it away*, in the sense of showing what it is about the use of expressions that made theorists mistakenly try to understand them in representationalist semantic terms. (He thinks the good distinction between the genuine and important *expressive* role of 'true' and 'refers', by contrast to the *disqualification* that expressive role gives to semantic *explanations* (of a certain sort) appealing to them, is what is wanted here, too.)

This should be regarded as setting an open question as we go forward in the course:

- **Are there reasons to want to "reconstruct the representational dimension of conceptual content in pragmatist terms"?**
- **And what are the prospects for doing so?**

Reformulate:
Note that in making this complaint, Price is committed to a distinction between two enterprises, one suitable to pragmatics and the other a pragmatist reconstruction of what descriptivist-representationalist semantics was right about, that in many ways mimics the distinction that the positive thesis of semantic minimalism (which he rejects) makes. (Though he will claim it is only the distinction between the negative thesis and the positive thesis that he is committed to. So my real question is whether he can maintain *that* distinction, ultimately, the distinction between the positive thesis's bifurcationism and his distinction between the negative and the positive thesis. This complex question will arise most pointedly for his distinction between I-representation and E-representation.

III.   Re "Expressivism for Two Voices" (ETV):

Key points here include:
- (1)-(4) below:
  Uniformitarianism in pragmatics (plus pragmatist derivation of semantics from pragmatics)—BEX—supporting declarativism, vs. **functional pluralism** (HEX).
- (5) and (6) below:
  Using his treatment of **"semantic minimalism" as a *paradigmatic* expressivism**, in the sense that he wants to extend his distinction between a (good) negative thesis (antimetaphysical) and a (bad) positive thesis, involving **bifurcation** and implicitly accepting representationalist semantic analysis of the contrasting class, for which one does *not* offer an expressivist analysis. This account is to be extended to begin with to the "3 'M's," from there to any other problematic vocabularies, and eventually globally. Cf. Tennyson's "little rift within the lute, that by and by shall make the music mute, and ever-widening, slowly silence all."

1. Big opposition is between:
a) Humean expressivism (HEX) and
b) Brandomian expressivism (BEX),
which he wants to synthesize into Total expressivism (TEX).

2. These correspond to two insights, and **two attitudes towards the later Wittgenstein**:

   a) HEX focuses on pluralism of function, what *distinguishes* the use of different (functional) kinds of expression. This is the idea that language is a (functional) motley. This is the proper use of the "tool" metaphor: not for language as a whole, but for the different things one can *do* with words. Key here is that HEX folks are specifying what one is

doing in using, e.g., normative vocabulary. They are working in a pragmatic metavocabulary.

b) BEX [which is *one strand* of my view(s): see below] focuses on what is *common* to different discursive practices, in virtue of what distinguishes practices as *discursive* practices.   Here we can focus on the pragmatics side of the "iron triangle of discursiveness." Contra LW, language has a downtown, and it is assertion, saying in something in the sense of making a claim. I understand that as taking up a *position* in a game or practice of giving and challenging *reasons*. That is a practice articulated by inferential relations of being a reason *for* (implication) and being a reason *against* (incompatibility).

Looking for this underlying unity is the impulse to systematic theorizing.

It is **a *transcendental* (Kantian or its Hegelian heir) impulse**.

Rorty and Price do not share this impulse. They (and Misak would agree) find it deeply at odds with the motivating pragmatist *pluralist* insight.

They all see **pragmatism as *essentially* codifying the wisdom of foxes, not hedgehogs**.

In this regard, I am more like Sellars (and, I want to say, Peirce), in looking to pragmatism (in effect, given that Sellars mostly rejects the characterization of what he is doing as pragmatism, partly for this very unifying-systematizing / plurality-appreciation of differences distinction at a level somewhat above that of mere methodology—something like *motivation* for methodology) for the clues to systematic theorizing about language.

3. His reconciliation is in effect twofold:

a) BEX investigates the bland common canvas to which HEX then applies its motley colors, the framework within which it distinguishes the various, unsurveyable practices and functional roles in practice take place. They are unsurveyable in principle for the reasons Hans-Julius Schneider [in *Phantasie und Kalkul*] has articulated: the plastic, protean character of discursive practice, which essentially consists in projection, the unpredictable, ramshackle extension of old practices into new ones, constrained only by practitioners' capacity and willingness to catch on and "go on in the same way," or rather, to define a new, extended notion of "same" just by being able to keep the practice going. [Elaborated in (5) below.]
b) [Elaborated in [6] below.

4. Putting Price and me together, before putting HEX and BEX together:

a) Price's Priority Thesis contends that the issue of explaining or explicating discursive practice (the task of pragmatics) is conceptually, because explanatorily prior to that of investigating the objects referred to and the facts that are stated by using expressions (the

task of semantics, understood on a representational-descriptive model). His diagnosis of object naturalism as depending on a commitment to using a representational semantic model, in the context of the Priority Thesis, entails that subject naturalism is what you get if you subtract that representationalist semantic commitment from object naturalism.

b)   If you divide the object naturalism/subject naturalism distinction through by its commitment to naturalism, by

    i)   first understanding both in terms of the (meta)vocabulary one uses to do semantics (for object naturalism) and pragmatics (for subject naturalism), and then

    ii)   then relaxing the overarching commitment to naturalism that consists in requiring that the metavocabularies in question be naturalistic ones: the vocabulary of some natural science,

the result is one important strand of my focus on *pragmatic* metavocabularies, rather than *semantic* metavocabularies. (See Chapter One of Between Saying and Doing.)

c)   I am claiming that there is a sense of "pragmatism" that consists in making this move: the one that shows up in Price as the distinction between and conceptual priority of *subject* naturalism to *object* naturalism, and my methodological commitment to the conceptual priority of *pragmatic* metavocabularies over *semantic* metavocabularies. Price can be understood as filling in the latter distinction by adding a commitment restricting the metavocabularies to naturalistic ones.

d)   *This* sense of 'pragmatism'—the conceptual-explanatory priority of pragmatic to semantic metavocabularies, with both the restriction of *both* those metavocabularies to *naturalistic* ones that Price endorses and the restriction of *semantic* metavocabularies to *representational* ones (on which we agree, and which demotes and alleviates object naturalism's concern with placement or location problems—is at least in principle neutral between, orthogonal to, the fox/hedgehog pluralist-motley/systematic-principled unity distinction between a sort of pragmatism and its platonist foe.

5. **Negative thesis of ETV**:
Huw's irenic proposed *rapprochement* of HEX and BEX can be thought of as seeing the uniformitarianism of BEX as supporting and articulating a kind of bland, anodyne *declarativism* that need not support *descriptivism.* In particular, it does not oblige us to use a *uniform* semantic model for all declaratives. It is compatible with acknowledging a variety of kinds of assertions with embeddable, truth-evaluable contents. And *a fortiori*, it does not oblige us to use a uniform descriptivist-representationalist semantic model. In this sense, then, he wants to say that BEX allows or leaves room for the functional pluralism of HEX. This is the negative thesis of ETV.

6. **Positive thesis of ETV**:

But there is a positive thesis as well. This is a way in which he thinks BEX can actually *help* and support HEX. Here the relevant issue is the opposition between *pragmatism* and *metaphysics*. This is one of the prime dimensions along which Price aligns with Rorty. Price thinks of metaphysics (paradigmatically, placement or location problems) as coming in if one has an object-naturalist commitment, which he further sees as downstream from a *representationalist* commitment. And he rejects metaphysics in this sense in favor of a pragmatism in the form of subject naturalism, or in my broader terms, in favor of focus on *pragmatic* metavocabularies.

The positive use he thinks pragmatism of this sort can make of my filling in a declarativist commitment by a uniform account, in a pragmatic metavocabulary, of assertional practices (and so, via the "iron triangle" of declarative sentences on the side of syntax and propositional content on the side of semantics) is that **he sees the assimilation of all declarative sentences afforded by a pragmatist pragmatic theory of assertion (in normative and inferential terms) as giving a metaphysically hygienic account of why people are tempted to think declarativism entails a nontrivial descriptivism.** For we get truth-evaluability for free, that is, in a metaphysically deflated sense. And it lets us understand what he will call "i-representation" as a dimension of assertion, in a correspondingly deflated sense.

Here I think (though he doesn't drill down to this level of detail) my story about the *use* of *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude (in terms of social-practical perspectival attitudes of attributing and undertaking commitments), together with the claim that such locutions are the principal and original locus of talk about what we are talking and thinking *about* (by contrast to what we are saying about it), fills in an account of a metaphysically deflated way of understanding descriptive-representational aspects of the use of all declaratives.
And this, Price thinks, is something HEX theorists can welcome.

His paradigm here is Blackburn, whose "quasi-realism" arguably *is* substantially aided in its articulation (in making explicit the expressive tightrope it walks) by the conceptual materials BEX provides.

Part IV:

I-representation and E-representation:

1. **e-Representation:** On the one hand, we have the *environment-tracking* paradigm of representation, dependent on such notions as covariation and 'indication relations' (Field 1994) – think of examples such as the position of the needle in the fuel gauge and the level of fuel in the tank, the barometer reading and air pressure and so on. In these cases, the crucial idea is that some feature of the representing system either does, or is (in some sense) 'intended to', vary in parallel with some feature of the represented system. (Usually, but perhaps not always, the

covariation in question has a causal basis.) In biological cases, for example, this notion gives priority to the idea that the function of a representation is to covary with some (typically) *external* environmental condition: it puts the system–world link on the front foot.

2. **i-Representation:** On the other hand, we have a notion that gives priority to the *internal* functional role of the representation: something counts as a representation in virtue of its position or role in some cognitive or inferential architecture. Here it is an *internal* role of some kind – perhaps causal–functional, perhaps logico-inferential, perhaps computational – that takes the lead. [TEPTB 36]

The two notions have their origins in two distinct notions of representation. The former belongs in a particular (normative, inferentialist) version of the systemic-functional notion, which characterises representations in terms of their roles in networks of various kinds. The latter belongs with notions of representation as environmental covariance. **My new bifurcation thesis claims that these are not two competing accounts of a single species of representation but two quite different beasts; and that it is this fact, not the old bifurcation thesis, that is the key distinction that expressivists need to make their project run smoothly**. [TEPTB 38]

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Plan:

Part I. is (1) above:
1. Subject/Object Naturalism.
2. How to "divide through by the naturalism."
3. My rendering in terms of the relations between pragmatic metavoabularies and semantic metavocabularies.
4. HP wants to use the *same* vocabulary, namely naturalistic vocabulary, that representationalists used to specify the representeds, in placement-location problems, to specify the *use* of representings (as they would think of it).

Part II is (2) above:

HEX:
Negative thesis (keep this).
Positive thesis (drop this).
HP wants to use his attitude toward semantic minimalism as a model for reformed HEX view of the "3 'M's" and all the other problematic vocabularies.
Then, he wants to globalize it.

Do that by accepting my unifying account of the pragmatics of assertion and stopping there, without making invidious distinctions between "nondescriptive" and "descriptive" discourses.